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Abstract
We adopt a standard search and matching model with endogenous job destruction
to investigate two issues. First, we use a simplified version of Boeri and Burda (2009) to
show that at sufficiently low levels of wage share, centralized wage bargaining performs
better than decentralized bargaining in terms of average productivity, unemployment,
and income inequality. Second, we incorporate active labor market policies in the model
and establish that they are more effective in reducing unemployment when wage setting
is centralized. Finally, numerical analysis suggests that the difference in effectiveness
is sizeable.
Keywords: Centralized wage setting, active labor market policy, frictional unem-
ployment, search and matching
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1 Introduction
The ‘Nordic’ model provides a way to look at the relation between inequality, productiv-
ity and employment compatible with the social democratic goal of combining egalitarian
distribution of earnings, security of income, and efficiency (see Moene 2008). The original
formulation of the model is due to two Swedish trade union economists, Gosta Rehn and
Rudolf Meidner, and dates back to the 1940s. Later on, Rehn and Meidner perfected it
and advocated its implementation by the Swedish government throughout the 1950s and
1960s.
Three main policies constituted the core of the model: restrictive fiscal policy, active
labor market policies (ALMPs) and solidaristic wage policy. In the context of a small open
economy during the post World War II boom, fighting inflation was a bigger concern than
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stimulating aggregate demand, which was kept high by the external channel: fiscal restraint
served this purpose. The two other policies together aimed at fostering structural change
while guaranteeing distributive equality and high employment. Centralized bargaining was
at the centre of the system. By negotiating equal remuneration for identical jobs (‘Equal
pay for equal jobs’) regardless of the productivity of plants or firms, centralized wage bar-
gaining was thought of as a tool capable not only of providing the equalization of earnings
but also of fostering productivity growth. A more compressed distribution of wages would
put pressure on low productivity plants, obliging them either to rationalize production,
thus increasing productivity directly, or to shut down, thus freeing resources potentially
employable by more dynamic and productive firms or sectors. Put differently, wage com-
pression would act as a subsidy to investment in more productive plants by increasing their
relative value, and thereby enhancing the scope for job relocation in high-tech activities.
ALMPs complement wage solidarity as they help the transition of workers from low to
high productive firms, sectors or regions. ALMPs could be either universal (matching poli-
cies and employment subsidies); or selective (supply-side retraining, vocational education,
relocation grants).
It is a matter of debate whether this model has been faithfully implemented (see Er-
ixon 2010). Centralized wage-setting, in any case, became a distinctive feature of Swedish
economic policy between 1956 and 1983. Two different phases can be distinguished. Phase
I began in 1956, when national unions of blue-collar workers (LO) and employers (SAF)
found the first comprehensive framework agreement for private blue-collar workers; it lasted
till the late 60s. During this period solidarity wage policy was properly applied according
to the principle ‘equal pay for equal jobs’, and centralized agreements favored wage equal-
ization among analogous jobs in different industries and plants (Hibbs and Locking 2000,
p. 760). In phase II, which began in the early 70s and ended in 1983 when the last com-
prehensive agreement was signed, the main goal of wage solidarity shifted from facilitating
structural change to achieving wage equalization per se, irrespective of the type of job.
As a result, wage inequality was reduced not only across plants and industries, but also
within plants and across skill grades. From the late 70s, this extensive wage compression
tended to reduce both returns to and investment in human capital, thus possibly favoring a
productivity slowdown (Leamer and Lundborg 1997, Lindbeck 1997). Empirical evidence
on the relation between wage dispersion and productivity (Hibbs and Locking 2000) sup-
ports the view that a reduction in ‘across-plant’ wage inequality positively affects labor
productivity growth, while a reduction in ‘within-plant’ wage inequality–accompanied by
an equalization across skill levels–would be harmful. Such difficulties led to a progressive
abandonment of centralized national bargaining, which after 1983 mostly took place at
industry and firm levels. Wage inequality regained ground, but currently it still stands at
levels substantially lower than in Anglo-American economies (see Pontusson 2006).
Spending on ALMPs became a key component of Swedish economic policies in 1957, and
it showed a positive trend as share of both GDP and government budget till the early 80s.
In terms of international comparisons, the Swedish GDP share of ALMP expenditures was
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consistently among the top OECD countries throughout the 70s and the 80s (see Erixon
2010). Empirical evaluations of the effect ALMPs had on unemployment in Sweden are
however not conclusive (see Calmfors 1993, Calmfors and Skedinger 1995).
Agell and Lommerud (1993), and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) provided possible for-
malizations for the Rehn-Meidner model by analyzing the positive relation between cen-
tralized wage bargaining and structural change. Agell and Lommerud (1993) develop an
endogenous growth model to show that egalitarian pay compression, combined with active
labor market policies, is analogous to an industrial policy of subsidizing the most promising
industries. Moene and Wallerstein (1997) compare the performances of centralized and de-
centralized wage bargaining in terms of productivity and employment outcomes in a vintage
growth model with exogenous technical change. They show that centralized bargaining is
always superior to local bargaining in terms of steady state productivity while it is always
inferior in terms of employment; the effects on investment and total output depend on the
share of productivity accruing to workers, i.e. the degree of wage moderation. They do
not consider, however, the role of active labor market policies.
Our paper adopts a standard search and matching model with endogenous job destruc-
tion to investigate two issues. First, we use a simplified version of Boeri and Burda (2009)
to show that at low levels of wage share, centralized wage bargaining performs better than
decentralized bargaining in terms of average productivity and unemployment. This result
is similar to the findings of Moene and Wallerstein (1997) and appears to describe properly
the experience of Nordic countries till the 80s. Next, we introduce ALMPs in Boeri and
Burda (2009) to assess their comparative performance under decentralized and central-
ized wage bargaining regimes. We establish analytically that, under certain conditions,
such policies are more effective in reducing unemployment under the centralized regime.
Furthermore, numerical analyses allow us to demonstrate this result for more general con-
figurations of the relevant parameters and to show that the difference in policy effectiveness
is quantitatively relevant.
Notice that, by adopting a framework like the one proposed by Boeri and Burda (2009),
we cannot properly talk about structural change, which would require a full-fledged multi-
sectoral growth model. This is the cost we pay to be able to achieve an analytical compar-
ison of active labor market policies under the alternative wage setting regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a standard search
and matching model with endogenous job destruction, and compares equilibrium outcomes
between centralized and decentralized wage setting regimes. Section 3 introduces labor
market policies in the model and carries out a comparison of their effectiveness under the
two bargaining systems. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 Centralized and Decentralized Wage Bargaining with Fric-
tional Labor Markets
The basic frictional labor market framework with endogenous job destruction is well known
and builds on Chapter 2 of Pissarides (2000). We adopt a simplified version of an extension
proposed by Boeri and Burda (2009), which allows a comparison of the effects of centralized
and decentralized wage setting in terms of unemployment, labor market tightness and
productivity.
2.1 Summary of the model
Workers are either employed earning the wage rate w or unemployed earning the unem-
ployment benefit b. Firms search for workers at the periodic cost c when vacant, or produce
output with productivity x when matched to a worker. The meeting process between firms
and workers is governed by the constant returns to scale matching function m(v, u) which
gives the number of matches per unit of time as a function of the number of vacancies (v)
and unemployed workers (u). A firm meets a worker with probability λf = m(v, u)/v. A
worker meets a firm with probability λw = m(v, u)/u. Let ϑ ≡ v/u be the tightness of the
labor market, then λf = m(ϑ, 1)/ϑ, and λw = m(ϑ, 1). We assume that the productivity
of newly created matches is equal to 1. Productivity is subject to idiosyncratic shocks
drawn from the distribution G(x), with x ∈ (0, 1]. When hit by a shock, a job changes its
productivity from its initial value x to some new value x′. Shocks arrive to matches at the
exogenous Poisson rate σ.
We start by deriving the asset value of states when wage bargaining is decentralized
(denoted by the subscript d), that is: when wages are negotiated at the individual match
level1. Let the values for workers and active firms of productivity x be W (x) and J(x); and
the values of unemployed workers and vacant firms be U and V . The following equations
hold:
rWd(x) = wd(x) + σ
1∫
Rd
[Wd(s)−Wd(x)]dG(s) + σG(Rd)[Ud −Wd(x)] (1)
rJd(x) = x− wd(x) + σ
1∫
Rd
[Jd(s)− Jd(x)]dG(s) + σG(Rd)[Vd − Jd(x)] (2)
rUd = b+ λw[Wd(1)− Ud] (3)
rVd = −c+ λf [Jd(1)− Vd], (4)
1It is worth recalling that a decentralized systems in a frictional environment is different from a com-
petitive setting where workers’ competition would tend to equalize wages.
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where r is the interest rate, and Rd is the reservation productivity below which a match
is no longer profitable and is destroyed. Rd is determined endogenously in the model as
the solution to J(Rd) = 0. Expression (1) equates the flow value of being employed in a
match of productivity x to the wage rate plus the expected capital gain associated with a
shock, which will be either positive if the shock is higher than the current productivity or
negative otherwise. If the new x is below the reservation productivity, the worker becomes
unemployed and obtains the value of unemployment Ud. Analogously in equation (2) the
flow value of an active firm is equal to the profit flow plus the expected capital gain or loss.
Equation (3) defines the value of unemployment as the sum of unemployment benefits plus
the expected gain from finding employment. In (4) the value of a vacancy is given by the
expected gain from becoming active minus the cost of search. Notice that Ud and Vd are
not productivity specific as all newly created matches have productivity x = 1.
Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, profits from new jobs are driven to zero, so that
Vd = 0 and, from (4),
Jd(1) =
c
λf
. (5)
Wages are derived as the solution to a Nash sharing rule. As a consequence, at all
productivities x, the wage rate divides the total surplus of a match in fixed proportions:
Wd(x)− Ud = β[Jd(x) +Wd(x)− Ud], (6)
where β is a measure of workers’ bargaining power. Manipulating (1) and (2), and making
use of (5), (6) and Vd = 0, yields the wage equation
2
wd(x) = (1− β)b+ β(x+ cλw/λf ) = (1− β)b+ β(x+ cϑd). (7)
The wage equation can be substituted into (2) to find
(r + σ)Jd(x) = (1− β)(x− b)− βcϑd + σ
1∫
Rd
Jd(s)dG(s). (8)
Evaluating (8) at x = Rd, and subtracting the resulting equation from (8), after using
J(Rd) = 0 we get
(r + σ)Jd(x) = (1− β)(x−Rd), (9)
which, calculated at x = 1, together with (5) yields the job creation condition as a function
of Rd and ϑd
(1− β) 1−Rd
r + σ
=
c
λf
=
c
m(ϑd, 1)
ϑd. (JCd)
2See Pissarides (2000, p. 42) for a derivation.
5
In JCd the expected gain from a new job is equated to the expected hiring cost. It is
downward sloping in the plane (R,ϑ) as a higher Rd reduces the expected lifetime of a job.
Such a reduction in expected profitability has to be compensated by a higher probability
of creating a match (λf ), which is an inverse function of ϑd.
In order to derive the job destruction condition as a relation between Rd and ϑd, we
substitute Jd(x) from (9) into the integral expression of (8), then evaluate the resulting
equation at x = Rd and finally substitute it into the zero-profit condition for the reservation
job, Jd(Rd) = 0:
Rd = b+
βc
(1− β)ϑd −
σ
r + σ
1∫
Rd
(s−Rd)dG(s). (JDD)
JDd slopes up as a higher tightness raises the workers’ outside option and, in turn, their
wages; then, a higher reservation productivity is required to make the marginal job break
even. The system made up of JCd and JDd determines the equilibrium values R
∗
d and ϑ
∗
d.
Finally, steady state equilibrium requires the equalization of flows into and out of unem-
ployment. Flow into unemployment is equal to the share of jobs hit by a productivity shock
x < R∗d, that is σG(R
∗
d)(1 − u). Flow out of unemployment is the number of unemployed
workers finding a job, m(ϑ∗d, 1)u. Accordingly, equilibrium unemployment satisfies:
u∗d =
σG(R∗d)
σG(R∗d) +m(ϑ
∗
d, 1)
. (ud)
Let us now turn to the centralized bargaining case (denoted by the subscript c). Under this
regime, wages are set independently of the productivity of an individual match. We assume
wc(x) = x¯, with x¯ ∈ (b, 1]. The lower bound b ensures that the participation constraint for
employment is satisfied. The valuation of states for workers and firms are
rWc = x¯+ σG(Rc)[Uc −Wc] (10)
rJc(x) = x− x¯+ σ
1∫
Rc
[Jc(s)− Jc(x)]dG(s) + σG(Rc)[Vc − Jc(x)] (11)
rUc = b+ λw[Wc − Uc] (12)
rVc = −c+ λf [Jc(1)− Vc]. (13)
Notice that only the job valuation by a firm is productivity specific. Proceeding analogously
to the decentralized case, the job creation and job destruction condition can be obtained
as3
3See Boeri and Burda (1999, p. 1462) for a derivation.
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1−Rc
r + σ
=
c
λf
=
c
m(ϑc, 1)
ϑc (JCc)
Rc = x¯− σ
r + σ
1∫
Rc
(s−Rc)dG(s). (JDc)
Similarly to the decentralized case, JCc is downward sloping in the (R, ϑ) plane and lies
everywhere to the right of JCd. For any reservation productivity level (R), more vacancies
are created in the centralized regime than in the decentralized one: the expected gain of a
new job is higher as workers’ remuneration is isolated from the firm’s valuation of a newly
created job (J(1)). In particular, workers do not split with the entrepreneurs the rents
of the match. Contrary to the decentralized regime, the wage rate is fixed and does not
respond to market conditions through the worker’s outside option; therefore JDc does not
depend on ϑ and, it is flat in the (R, ϑ) plane.
Analogously to the decentralized case, the equilibrium unemployment condition is:
u∗c =
σG(R∗c)
σG(R∗c) +m(ϑ∗c , 1)
. (uc)
Before proceeding to the comparison between the two wage setting systems, note that,
both in the centralized and in the decentralized regime, the reservation productivity level
R is positively related to the average productivity of the system since E(x) =
∫ 1
R xdG(x).
2.2 Discussion of the Nordic Model
The two sets of three equations (JC), (JD) and (u) allow a comparison of centralized
and decentralized regimes, and can help us understand how Nordic countries managed to
achieve relatively low unemployment rates, high productivity and low income inequality
for a considerable period of time.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We have already established that JCc lies to the right of JCd in the (R, ϑ) plane. The
relation between JDc and JDd is not as straightforward because the former is horizontal
while the latter is upward sloping. We focus on one specific value at which JDc is constant.
Let us consider x¯ as an exogenous variable, given at the institutional level, and let us
start with the case x¯ = b + [β/(1 − β)]cϑ∗d, which, it can be shown, is the reservation
wage in the decentralized case4. In such a situation, JDc will be a flat line through the
4See eq. 2.9 in Pissarides (2000, p. 42) and remember that, by definition, the reservation wage is equal
to the flow value of unemployment.
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decentralized equilibrium (R∗d, ϑ
∗
d), so that R
∗
c = R
∗
d and ϑ
∗
c > ϑ
∗
d (see Figure 1). Moreover,
since u is a decreasing function of ϑ in both systems, u∗c < u∗d. Given the decentralized
(free market) equilibrium, we have built a centralized equilibrium that performs better in
terms of employment, has lower (in fact zero) pay inequality and is as productive as the
decentralized system. The result is not surprising. By keeping workers’ remuneration in
the centralized case at the minimum necessary to ensure their participation in the labor
market in the decentralized case, our assumption implies a lower workers’ income share in
the centralized case, i.e. wage moderation. Firms internalize the share β of the surplus
match, which goes to workers under the decentralized setting; accordingly, they invest
more, thus raising the number of vacancies and reducing unemployment.
Figure 2 shows what happens if we raise x¯ above its initial level. JDc will be translated
upward, and the centralized equilibrium will move continuously along the JCc, hence yield-
ing a reduction in ϑ∗c and an increase in R∗c . Since unemployment is monotonic increasing
in R, and monotonic decreasing in ϑ, raising x¯ produces an increase in u∗c . However, since
u is continuous both in R and ϑ there will exist a range of values for x¯, say x¯ ∈ (b+ β1−β cϑ∗d,
x0] with x0 < 1 an unknown upper bound, where ϑ
∗
c > ϑ
∗
d, R
∗
c > R
∗
d and u
∗
c < u
∗
d. This
set of equilibria appears as a fairly accurate representation of the Scandinavian experience,
where centralized wage bargaining combined with wage moderation, allowed the economic
system to perform well in terms of productivity, employment and equality 5.
[Figure 2 about here.]
3 Policy Analysis
We now address the issue of how ALMPs perform in each system. We focus on policies
which improve the prospects for successful pairings of unemployed workers and firms with
vacancies6. We represent such policies by means of a shift variable in the matching function.
Let z be expenses in labor market policies, the matching function becomes m(v, u, z), with
mz > 0. In particular, in accordance with several empirical studies (see Pissarides 2000, p.
6), we assume a Cobb Douglas specification of the matching function
m(v, u, z) = g(z)vαu1−α, (14)
where g′(.) > 0. Accordingly, we have λf = g(z)ϑα−1, and λw = g(z)ϑα.
The steady state equilibrium conditions for the decentralized case can be re-written as
5In section 3.2, we provide numerical examples supporting the argument that centralized wage setting
allows to reach lower levels of unemployment when combined with wage moderation.
6Boone and van Ours (2004) formalize ALMPs in the context of frictional labor markets. However, they
do not consider matching policies nor the interaction of ALMPS with decentralized and centralized wage
setting regimes.
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(1− β) 1−Rd
r + σ
=
cϑ1−αd
g(z)
(JC’d)
Rd = b+
βc
(1− β)ϑd −
σ
r + σ
1∫
Rd
(s−Rd)dG(s) (JD’d)
ud =
σG(Rd)
σG(Rd) + g(z)ϑ
α
d
, (u’d)
whereas the system of equations describing the centralized bargaining equilibrium becomes
1−Rc
r + σ
=
cϑ1−αc
g(z)
(JC’c)
Rc = x¯− σ
r + σ
1∫
Rc
(s−Rc)dG(s) (JD’c)
uc =
σG(Rc)
σG(Rc) + g(z)ϑαc
. (u’c)
Before proving our main result, we shall discuss how the introduction of a policy instrument
changes the structure of the model. Let us first consider the interaction between JD and
JC in the (R, ϑ) plane. In both the decentralized and the centralized case, our policy
variable z enters JC but leaves JD unaltered. In particular, an increase in z raises the
probability that a firm will find a match, thus boosting investment; but it does not affect
the productivity level at which jobs are scrapped. The two systems, however, respond
differently to an outward shift in the JC (due to the increase in z). In the centralized one,
the flat JD implies that the equilibrium reservation productivity will stay constant, while
the equilibrium tightness will increase; in the decentralized case, since the JD is upward
sloping, both R∗ and ϑ∗ will rise. As for equilibrium unemployment, it may change in
response to an increase in z through two channels. In the first place, the policy change
directly alters unemployed workers’ probability of finding a job, thus increasing the flow
out of unemployment, and reducing the unemployment rate: this effect is present in both
systems. Secondly, and only in the decentralized case, the policy change increases workers’
reservation wage by raising their outside option. This effect increases unemployment by
raising the equilibrium reservation productivity. On the contrary, the centralized system,
by paying a fixed wage independently of the match productivity, turns off the increase in
workers’ reservation wage, and its adverse effect on unemployment.
We are now in the position to prove our main result on the complementarity between
ALMP and centralized wage setting. We first prove this result analytically for value of
wc sufficiently close to the reservation wage in the decentralized case. We later verify our
result for higher values of wc by means of numerical analyses.
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3.1 Analytical Result
The overall effect on unemployment of a policy change depends on the initial equilibrium
position. Analytically, we cannot establish that matching policies are uniformly more
effective in the centralized case; we restrict our proposition to the case when the centralized
wage is equal to the outside option of the decentralized case, or when it is sufficiently close
to it. We thus prove the existence of a set of values for wc where ALMPs are more effective
in reducing unemployment under the centralized system. Notice that values outside this
set do not necessarily imply that the centralized system is less effective. Let xˆ > b+ β1−β cϑ
∗
d
be an unknown productivity level, we state
Proposition 1 when wc(x) = x¯ ∈ [b + β1−β cϑ∗d, xˆ ], an increase in z raises ϑ∗c more than
it raises ϑ∗d, i.e. dϑ
∗
c/dz > dϑ
∗
d/dz, and it reduces the ratio u
∗
c/u
∗
d.
Proof. See Appendix.
Our main result sheds light on a possible complementarity between the two building
blocks of the Nordic model, that is centralized wage setting and active labor market policies.
Matching policies display higher efficiency in reducing unemployment under the centralized
case as wage setting is not affected by workers’ higher probability of finding a job, which
would raise their outside option and their reservation wage. It must be noted, however, that
in the decentralized setting matching policies would have a virtuous effect on productivity
by raising its reservation level.
Even if we cannot establish analytically that matching policies are uniformly more
effective for unemployment in the centralized case, it is worth noticing that the effect of
policy on ϑ is likely to be larger in the centralized case even for wc much higher than the
reservation wage. Comparing dϑ∗c/dz and an upper bound of dϑ∗d/dz for R
∗′
d (z) = 0 (see
eqs. 15-16 in the Appendix), we obtain the sufficient condition dϑ∗c/dz > dϑ∗d/dz if ϑ
∗
c/ϑ
∗
d >
(1−β)1/α
(
1−R∗d
1−R∗c
)1/α
. The term on the RHS of this inequality is lower than 1 for plausible
value of β and of the reservation productivities7. With regard to the LHS, the JCc lies
to the right of the JCD and hence ϑ
∗
c tends to be larger than ϑ
∗
d unless the centralized fix
wage is extremely high. The sufficient condition appears satisfied in most realistic cases8.
3.2 Numerical Result
In this section we show that the result we obtained in Proposition 1 holds for a larger set
of values of wc; in particular, we verify the result for cases where wc is high relative to
7For instance, if β = .5, RHS > 1 when the ratio of the active technologies in use in the decentralized
and centralized systems, is bigger than 2. This would require that the fixed wage in the centralized system
puts so much pressure on plants that the set of active technologies in this system turns out being less than
half the set of active technologies in the decentralized system, quite an unrealistic case.
8One may wonder whether the net welfare effect of adopting such policies would be positive. Our
framework does not address this question as we have not incorporated the cost of financing the policy. This
issue, however, does not affect the analysis of comparative benefits under the two wage setting regimes.
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the reservation wage of the decentralized case (wR). Additionally, we compare the relative
magnitude of policy effects for different configurations of the labor market (LM) param-
eters, namely wc in the centralized case and (β, b) in the decentralized case; notice that
(β, b) are the two parameters affecting directly the reservation wage in the decentralized
case.
In order to simplify our analysis we add the following two assumptions: the probability
distribution of productivity shocks G(x) is uniform in the support (0, 1], i.e. G(x) = x;
the matching function is linear in labor market policy expenses, given by g(z) = A(1 + z)
where A is a scale parameter with A < 1. The steady state equilibrium conditions for the
decentralized case become
ϑ1−αd = (1− β)
A(1 + z)
c
1−Rd
r + σ
(JC”d)
Rd = b+
βc
(1− β)ϑd −
σ
r + σ
(1−Rd)2
2
(JD”d)
ud =
σRd
σRd +A(1 + z)ϑ
α
d
, (u”d)
whereas the equilibrium conditions in the centralized system are now:
ϑ1−αc =
A(1 + z)
c
1−Rc
r + σ
(JC”c)
Rc = wc − σ
r + σ
(1−Rc)2
2
(JD”c)
uc =
σRc
σRc +A(1 + z)ϑαc
. (u”c)
Our additional assumptions allow us to find a closed form solution for the two systems
of equations. However, assessing the sign of the derivative d/dz(u∗c/u∗d) is still not possible
unless numerical values are assigned to the models’ parameters. Accordingly, our strategy is
the following: we calibrate the exogenous parameters of the model to obtain the equilibrium
unemployment levels in both systems as mere numerical functions of the policy variable z.
At that point, evaluating d/dz(u∗c/u∗d) at z = 0 tells us whether activating ALMP reduces
the equilibrium unemployment ratio.
We perform this excercise for twelve different scenarios. We keep a set of core parame-
ters constant, and we characterize the various cases by assuming different configurations of
the LM parameters. For the LM parameters in the decentralized system, we consider four
cases which can be ranked in ascending order of degree of decentralization: 1. β = .2, b = .4,
2. β = .3, b = .3, 3. β = .4, b = .1, 4. β = .5, b = 0. These cases can be thought of as
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either mimicking the mixed wage setting system gradually gaining ground in Sweden dur-
ing the 80s or, more generally, as representing different degrees of decentralization across
capitalistic regimes. For the centralized system, we have considered three values of wc.
First, we anchor wc at the level of the reservation wage in order to replicate the results of
Proposition 19. Next, we set wc equal to two values that are always above the reservation
wages derived in the four cases, i.e. 0.75 and 0.8. These levels of wc capture more realistic
situations where national unions bargain a wage level higher than the outside option a
worker would have had in the case of decentralized bargaining.
With regard to the parameters held constant across scenarios, we use the efficiency of
the matching function A to generate realistic initial levels of unemployment in absence of
the policy. We set A = 0.15. The other parameters are standard in the literature and
chosen accordingly. In particular, the interest rate r is set equal to 2%, the exogenous
separation rate σ and the cost of a new vacancy c equal 0.1, while the elasticity of the
matching function to the labour market tightness is assumed to be 0.5 (see Blanchard and
Diamond 1989, Yashiv 2000, Boeri and Burda 2009, and Pissarides and Vallanti 2007).
Table 1 presents the main results of the numerical exercises. First, columns 2− 3 show
that when wc is set at the level of the workers’ reservation wage in the decentralized regime
equilibrium unemployment, absent the policy (z = 0), is lower under the centralized bar-
gaining regime. This result corroborates our analysis in Section 2: centralized bargaining
combined with wage moderation yields low levels of unemployment. Second, column 3
confirms our main result since ALMPs appear more effective in the centralized regime re-
gardless the level of wc. In particular, the sign of d/dz(u
∗
c/u
∗
d) is negative for all the levels
of the centralized wage we have considered. In this regard, notice that we chose extremely
high levels of wc. By definition, wc equals the product of the wage share times average
labor productivity; since average productivity is strictly smaller than one, the wage share
is bounded from below by the level of the centralized wage10. In fact, such high levels of
wc shows that the complementarity between ALMPs and centralized wage setting does not
require wage moderation. Additional robustness checks for z > 0 confirm results obtained
in column 311.
The last two columns of Table 1 enable us to compare the relative magnitude of the
effects under different wage bargaining regimes. First, under the centralized regime, the
negative growth rate of unemployment ranges from 2 to more than 4 times the one obtained
under the various decentralized cases. Second, the effect of the policy in the centralized
regime is lower the higher the level of wc. Job relocation is, in fact, easier when the level
of the reservation productivity is relatively lower, i.e. when the level of wc is lower. In this
case, a displaced worker is more likely to be matched with a technology with productivity
higher than Rc. Finally, in line with our main result, complementarity between ALMPs and
9Notice that for every decentralized case there will be a corresponding reservation wage. Therefore, we
consider four values for wc = wR.
10Under our additional assumption, G(x) = x, E(x) = (1 +R)/2 < 1.
11Results are available upon request.
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relatively rigid labor market regimes appears to be valid not only in the comparison between
centralized and decentralized systems, but also among systems with different degrees of
decentralization. Indeed, ALMPs are significantly more effective in systems with mild
levels of decentralization, such as cases 1 and 2, than in systems with relatively higher
levels of decentralization, cases 3-4.
[Table 1 about here.]
4 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a new formalization of two important features of the Nordic labor
market model prevailing in the 60s and 70s. Centralized wage setting, the first pillar of
this model, partially isolates wages from variations in plant-specific productivity levels,
thereby increasing the relative profitability of more productive with respect to less pro-
ductive plants. However, this comes at the cost of reducing the expected lifetime of firms’
investment and might generate structural unemployment. The second important feature
of the Nordic model is represented by policies designed to offset the negative impact of
centralized bargaining on employment; in particular, wage moderation and active labor
market policies. We focus on the latter aspect and extend recent analyses of frictional
labor markets with different wage setting rules (Boeri and Burda 2009) by considering ac-
tive labor market policies. Our analysis suggests a complementarity between active labor
market policies and centralized wage setting. We formally establish that these policies are
more effective in reducing unemployment in a centralized rather than in a decentralized
wage setting regime. Unlike in the centralized regime where wages are unaffected by mar-
ket conditions, in the decentralized regime ALMPs increase the worker’s external option by
raising the value of search. A more valuable search induces an increase in the reservation
productivity and partially hampers the positive effect of the policy on employment. On
the other hand, this increase implies a positive effect of the policy on productivity that
does not occur in the centralized system. Finally, numerical exercises enable us to show
that the difference in policy effectiveness between the two regimes is sizeable.
In line with previous analyses by Moene and Wallerstein (1997), we show that, at low
level of the fixed wage, centralized bargaining performs better than decentralized bargain-
ing in terms of both employment and productivity. However, a more accurate analysis of
the effect of wage moderation on employment would demand the wage rate be determined
endogenously as the outcome of unions’ maximizing behavior. In this fashion, wage moder-
ation could emerge as the optimal decision of a central union that internalizes the general
equilibrium effect of wage setting. The capacity to internalize the wage-unemployment
trade-off of centralized systems has been advocated as an explanation of relatively good
performance of centralized systems vis a` vis decentralized ones (Calmfors and Driffill 1988,
Howell et al. 2007).
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Finally, effective job relocation depends in part on workers’ willingness to invest in new
skills, especially in phases of fast technological change as the ones followed the ICT revo-
lution. By eliminating wage differences, centralized regimes might provide weak incentives
to invest in skills complementary to new technologies, hence reducing the profitability of
opening new, innovative plants. Compared to systems with flexible wage regimes, systems
with rigid wage settings have to be more active in providing the right incentives to in-
vest in skills through subsidies to higher education and retraining (Amendola and Vona
2012). Moreover, if general skills adapt to innovations better than specific ones (Krueger
and Kumar 2004), the appropriate strategy to favor job relocation would require direct
intervention in the educational system rather than on vocational and on-the-job training.
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A Appendix
Let us start by establishing the first claim of our proposition, that is dϑ∗c/dz > dϑ∗d/dz.
Remember that our initial condition assures R∗c = R∗d, ϑ
∗
c > ϑ
∗
d and that Rc does not
depend on the position of JCc. Differentiate totally JC’c to find
dϑ∗c
dz
= ϑ∗
′
c (z) = g
′(z)
(1−R∗c)
c(r + σ)
ϑ∗αc
1− α. (15)
Notice, on the contrary, that R∗d = R
∗
d(z), with R
∗′
d (z) > 0. Totally differentiating JC
’
D
yields
dϑ∗d
dz
= ϑ∗
′
d (z) =
(1− β)
c(r + σ)
ϑ∗αd
1− α [g
′(z)(1−R∗d)− g(z)R∗
′
d (z)]. (16)
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Comparison of (15) and (16) prove our claim since β < 1, ϑ∗c > ϑ∗d, R
∗
c = R
∗
d, andR
∗′
d (z) > 0.
Let us now prove that d(u∗c/u∗d)/dz < 0, where:
u∗c
u∗d
(z) =
σG(R∗c)
σG(R∗c) + g(z) (ϑ∗c(z))
α
σG(R∗d(z)) + g(z) (ϑ
∗
d(z))
α
σG(R∗d(z))
.
Let us posit σG(R∗c) ≡ k1, σG(R∗d(z)) ≡ k2(z), g(z) (ϑ∗c(z))α ≡ fc(z), g(z) (ϑ∗d(z))α ≡ fd(z).
We can write
u∗c
u∗d
(z) =
k1
k1 + fc(z)
k2(z) + fd(z)
k2(z)
= k1
1 + fd(z)/k2(z)
k1 + fc(z)
. For any arbitrary
initial (i.e. pre- policy change) value z = z0, our established results imply: k1 = k2(z0),
fc(z0) > fd(z0). Also notice that k
′
2(z0) > 0, since G
′
(.) > 0. Let us now prove f
′
c(z0) >
f
′
d(z0). f
′
i = g
′(z0) (ϑ∗i (z0))
α + g(z0)α (ϑ
∗
i (z0))
α−1 ϑ∗
′
i (z0), with i = c, d. Since ϑ
∗
c(z0) >
ϑ∗d(z0), we only need to prove
ϑ∗
′
c (z0)
(ϑ∗c(z0))
1−α >
ϑ∗
′
d (z0)
ϑ∗d(z0)1−α
. Making use of (15) and (16), the
previous inequality is satisfied if g′(z0)
(1−R∗c)
c(r + σ)
ϑ∗2α−1c
1− α >
(1− β)
c(r + σ)
ϑ∗2α−1d
1− α [g
′(z0)(1− R∗d)−
g(z0)R
∗′
d (z0)]. Substituting the equilibrium expression for ϑ
∗
c and ϑ
∗
d from JC
’
c and JC
’
D, the
inequality can be re-written as
1
1− α
(
(1−R∗c)
c(r + σ)
) α
1−α
g′(z0) (g(z0))
2α−1
1−α >
1
1− α
(
(1− β)(1−R∗d)
c(r + σ)
) α
1−α
·
·
[
g′(z0) (g(z0))
2α−1
1−α − (1−R∗d)R∗
′
d (z0) (g(z0))
α
1−α
]
, which is always satisfied since β <
1, R∗c = R∗d, and R
∗′
d (z0) > 0.
Let us now calculate
d
dz
u∗c
u∗d
(z0).
d
dz
u∗c
u∗d
(z0) = k1
(k1 + fc(z0))
f
′
d(z0)k2(z0)− fd(z0)k
′
2(z0)
(k2(z0))
2
[k1 + fc(z0)]
2 −
k1
f
′
c(z0) (1 + fd(z0)/k2(z0))
[k1 + fc(z0)]
2 < 0⇔
f
′
d(z0)−
k
′
2(z0)
k2(z0)
fd(z0) +
fc(z0)f
′
d(z0)
k2(z0)
− fc(z0)fd(z0)k
′
2(z0)
(k2(z0))
2 − f
′
c(z0)−
f
′
c(z0)fd(z0)
k2(z0)
< 0,
where we used k1 = k2(z0). Since we have established that f
′
d(z0) < f
′
c(z0), a sufficient
condition for
d
dz
u∗c
u∗d
(z0) < 0 is fc(z0)f
′
d(z0) < f
′
c(z0)fd(z0). Let us verify it. fc(z0)f
′
d(z0) <
f
′
c(z0)fd(z0)
⇔ f
′
d(z0)
fd(z0)
<
f
′
c(z0)
fc(z0)
. Notice that
f
′
i (z0)
fi(z0)
=
g′(z0)
g(z0)
+ α
ϑ∗
′
i (z0)
ϑ∗i (z0)
, accordingly
f
′
d(z0)
fd(z0)
<
f
′
c(z0)
fc(z0)
⇔ ϑ
∗′
d (z0)
ϑ∗d(z0)
<
ϑ∗
′
c (z0)
ϑ∗c(z0)
.
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ϑ∗
′
d (z0)
ϑ∗d(z0)
=
1− β
c(r + σ)
1
1− α (ϑ
∗
d(z0))
α−1 ·
[
g′(z0)(1−R∗d)−R∗
′
d (z0)g(z0)
]
=
1
1− α
[
g′(z0)
g(z0)
−R∗′d (z0)g(z0)
]
;
ϑ∗
′
c (z0)
ϑ∗c(z0)
=
(1−R∗c)
c(r + σ)
g′(z0)
1− α (ϑ
∗
c(z0))
α−1 =
1
1− α
g′(z0)
g(z0)
;
Since since β < 1, and R∗′d (z0) > 0 we proved fc(z0)f
′
d(z0) < f
′
c(z0)fd(z0) and, in turn,
d
dz
u∗c
u∗d
(z0) < 0.
In order to prove our result for x¯ ∈ (b + β1−β cϑ∗d, xˆ] we can use a continuity argument
analogous to the one developed in Section 2. Since both R∗c and ϑ∗c are continuous functions
of x¯, there exists a right neighborhood of b+ β1−β cϑ
∗
d where all the inequalities we used in
our proof still hold. Notice that x0 6= xˆ, unless by a fluke.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium reservation productivity and market tightness under centralized and
decentralized wage settings when x¯ = b+ [β/(1− β)]cϑ∗d.
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Figure 2: Effect on centralized equilibrium of an increase in the centralized wage.
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Table 1: Effects of ALMP in different scenarios
uc(0) ud(0) sign[
d(uc/ud)
dz |z=0] ducuc |z=0 dudud |z=0
centralized wage wc = wR
case 1: β = .2, b = .4 0.091 0.110 - -1.81 -0.81
case 2: β = .3, b = .3 0.090 0.124 - -1.78 -0.72
case 3: β = .4, b = .1 0.077 0.121 - -1.85 -0.58
case 4: β = .5, b = .0 0.071 0.120 - -2.34 -0.54
centralized wage wc = 0.75 0.121 -1.76
case 1: β = .2, b = .4 = 0.110 - = -0.81
case 2: β = .3, b = .3 = 0.124 - = -0.72
case 3: β = .4, b = .1 = 0.121 - = -0.58
case 4: β = .5, b = .0 = 0.120 - = -0.54
centralized wage wc = 0.80 0.159 -1.68
case 1: β = .2, b = .4 = 0.110 - = -0.81
case 1: β = .3, b = .3 = 0.124 - = -0.72
case 1: β = .4, b = .1 = 0.121 - = -0.58
case 1: β = .5, b = .0 = 0.120 - = -0.54
values of the other parameters: σ = 0.1, α = 0.5, c = 0.1, r = 0.02, A = 0.15.
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